# **JLAB Tritium Target**

Dave Meekins et al 28 May 2014


# Overview


- 1. Design and major subsystems
- 2. Thermal/structural analysis of cell
- 3. Cell filling
- 4. Vent and stack
- 5. T2 detection and monitoring
- 6. Outstanding issues
- 7. Discussion

# **Subsystems**

- Target assembly
  - Cells
  - Positioning system
  - HX
- Scattering chamber
  - Pumps
  - T2 recovery
- Vent and stack
- Beamline
- Tritium detectors/monitors

## **Complete target assembly**





**Current Hall A Target** 


- Mount target stack where normal cryotarget cells go
- Lift system remains the same
- Mounts in current scattering chamber
- Saves money
- Controls nearly identical to cryotarget
- What happens if T2 cell fails

Mount cells here



# **Target Stack**

- Stack mounted to heat sink
  - Heat sink is cooled with 15K He from ESR
  - Heat sink is temp stabilized at ~35-40K
- Alignment and optics targets
- Positioned with cryotarget system
  - Alignment prior to vacuum and cool down ~0.25 mm
  - Target may move ~2 mm
- Total stack height is ~24 inches
  - Within crytarget limits (26 in)



# **Target Cells**

- Challenging machine work: JRP Machine
- Made from AI 7075-T651
  - Swagelok valves (metal bellows)/VCR fill ports
  - Extensive H2 service at JLAB
- Entrance windows attached with CF flange
  - Extensive service record with CF at low temperature
- Fill Pressures
  - T2: ~200 psi
  - He: ~375 psi
- Contains 1.1 kCi of T2
- Window thicknesses
  - o Entrance: 0.01 inch
  - Exit (beam): 0.011 inch
  - Wall 0.018 inch (0.015 in minimum)

# **Major concerns**

- Cells have thin sections
  - $\circ~$  Needed for electron beam and particle detection
- Diffusion through cell will occur
- Possible T2 embrittlement
- Possible loss of integrity from electron/T2/Al interactions
- •Cell failure from beam damage

# **Design Pressure**


•ASME B31.3 ○Unlisted material 7075 – T651 **OASTM B209** ■Sy=38 ksi ■Su=71 ksi ○B31.3 302.3.2 Design stress basis ■1/3 Su ■2/3 Sy • Design pressure is above 1100 psi for 0.015" walls

# **Design Evolution**


 SST welded construction Aluminum 2219 welded construction Aluminum 7075 bolted construction OMod 0 First generation difficult to machine oMod 1 easier to machine but thermo more challenging oMod 2 Smaller entrance tube diameter to meet experiment needs (not prototyped)




### Cell Design Mod 0




### Cell Design Mod 1



### Section View of Cell



### Entrance windows




## **Pressure test of Mod 1 cell**

- Cell wall thickness at thinnest point was 0.014 inch
- Main cell body burst pressure above 3500 psi
  - Factor of ~10 for safety
  - Static condition
  - Need to account for cyclic temperature/pressure loads
- Entrance windows
  - Burst Pressure ~2900 psi
- Operating pressure
  - 70 to 100 K running
  - 200 psi warm/standing



### Cell Entrance Window



Cell Entrance Window Burst ~2900 psi



Burst Test Cell exit burst above 3500 psi

# **Max Diffusion/Permeation**

Assumes:

conservative diffusion coefficient for AI 7075.

1 year at room temperature


Cell Location	J (mol/s)	Activity (Ci/s)
Entrance window	6.14E-15	6.6
Walls and exit window	1.29E-13	137.5
Flanges &fittings	1.77E-14	19.2
Total	1.5E-13	163.3

Total loss = 142 mCi/year

### Beam-induced and tritium embrittlement of cell

 Beam induced H2 corrosion of AI has been observed. •Threshold temperature for this is about 180K • This effect has not be evidenced in JLAB cryotargets Beam will ionize/disassociate the T2 ○T2 permeation could be a factor of 10 larger when beam is on Estimated T2 permeation loss <350 mCi/year (50%)</li> beam on 30% T2 cell in beam)


#### Section view of thick cell




## **Thermal and Mechanical Analysis**

- Mechanical analysis:
  - ASME B31.3 304.7.2 (design pressure >1100 psi)
  - ASME VIII D2 Section 5 analysis
     Elastic plastic model shows safe design
- Thermal Design
  - Not as effective for the newer cell
  - Max temp exceeds 160K for 35K heat sink
  - Older design ~90K
- Modification: thin exit window
  - o Thin by hand work
  - o no real impact on mechanical properties

### Thin Section



### Thermal model for thinned cell




# **Scattering Chamber**

- Secondary containment
  Not ideal with thin aluminum windows
- T2 detection in scattering chamber
  - RGA with remote head for low P
  - High pressure vacuum switch
- Reuse the Hall A Target Chamber
  - Saves considerable money
  - Reuse could contaminate the chamber
    - It is activated already
    - Decon by pumping ???
  - Scattering angle limit of ~12.5 deg
- Require a hood system connected to vent






#### **Scattering Chamber**



Hall A scattering chamber

- Large vacuum vessel with large openings for scattered particles
- Openings covered with 0.016" aluminum sheet (thin windows)
- Secondary containment
- Vacuum pumps are vented to stack
- "protected" by secondary getter pump (CapaciTorr D400-2)



## Vent Stack


- We would really like advice on this
- External stack of ~20m above grade
  - Civil/Facilities/Hall A
  - Route to back of Hall and out existing smoke removal system
  - Position near ESR
- Vent piping system connected to stack
  - extraction fan for handling and T2 detection in Hall
  - $\circ$  Detection in piping for T2

• Vacuum pumps exhaust to separate line

# Purpose of vent(s)

- Prevent T2 from contaminating Hall and personnel during normal ops and installation
  - Exhaust vacuum pumps to outside
  - Forced air cell handling hut with separate large bore vent
- Each vent must be stacked.
  - Stack height to be 20m above grade. Top of Hall A is 15m above grade.
- Vent connected to "hood" over chamber
  - triggered remotely during a release event

Vent and Stack (J. Miller)











# Beamline

- Require FSD on Raster
- Beamline isolation
  - Design by accelerator personnel
  - Collimator/Window
- Collimator
  - Prevent miss steer and cell damage
  - Design by accelerator
- Best place for extra components
  - o last girder before chamber
- Isolation window at scattering chamber entrance
- Hall A beamline liaison: Yves Roblin
  - o feels that these requests are reasonable
  - Offered design help

# **Cell handling**

Do not remove from shipping container until last.

- Install within chamber and temporary hut?
- Forced air from vent system
- •PPE?
- •Really like advice here
- •Return ASAP to SRS

### **Temporary cell handling hut**

- Hut needs to be connected to the vent
- Needs a seal on the chamber
  - Maybe tape
- enclosed when handling the cell
  - o install
  - $\circ$  removal
- negative air pressure so T2 will go out vent in case of accident
- Maybe something like the pictures
   o commercial?



# **Alarms/Failure modes**

- Fan flow/power fail
- T2 in stack
- T2 in Hall triggers "scram" button/smoke removal system
- T2 in scattering chamber
  - high pressure
  - $\circ$  low pressure
- Vacuum failure
- T2 cell failure
  - Getter system to absorb catastrophic cell fail

# **Filling Cells**

- We are hopefull that SRS/SRNL still willing to help but, understand the following concerns:
  - Cell design and testing passes engineering requirements
  - Reviewed by SRS
  - Shipping in standard BTSP is OK?
  - complete vessel drawing(s), includes all dimensions and materials and types of welds (if any)
  - type of filling valve(s)...or do you want a filling stem which we could pinch weld closed (pinch welding requires an extensive performance study and would have to be compatible with our equipment)
  - any burst pressure data and the method/procedure applied
  - any proof pressure data and the method/procedure applied (done at operating temperature?)
  - estimated activated residual...quantity, isotope, radiation form, flux and half-life...is there a hottest location?

# **Outstanding Issues**

- Stack design finalized
- plan for handling tritium cell needs to be formalized
- Requirements for beamline and scattering chamber must be formalized
- Detection of T2 in the Hall must be formalized
  - Baseline for T2 already in Hall
  - $\circ$  Low pressure we have
- Review
  - Another safety review will be required